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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

INTRODUCTION
Appellants submit the following brief in reply to the
briefs filed by respondants Joseph T. Kesler and Garth G. Myers.
This case involves plaintiffs appeal from summary judgment
entered in favor of said respondants.

Appellants submit in their

reply brief that respondants have shown in their briefs that
there are in fact genuine issues of material fact which preclude
-h,, c1ftinnance of the lower court's summary judgment,

that

'"spondants have raised issues that are not properly before this
court on appeal, and that respondants have otherwise failed to
•Jequately respond to the points raised in this appeal by
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dppellants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ARE
DEMONSTRATED BY RESPONDANTS BRIEFS.
Summary judgment is only proper where there are no
genuine issues of material fact.
Procedure.

Rule Sb, Utah Rules of Civil

Both respondants claim in their briefs that

appellants have alleged facts on appeal that are not part of the
record on appeal.

For example, Respondant Myers claims that the

record does not indicate specifically that Stephanie Payne's
obstetrician made a charge for the medical expense of removing
the IUD, and also that the record does not support the statement
that the IUD was removed for the purpose of allowing Mr. and
Payne to conceive a second child.

~r •.

Although appellants position

is that said facts are adequately of record by way of the deposetion of Dr. Gibbs,
deposition,

including the exhibits made a part of that

if those facts are not adequately of record, then

there are genuine issues of material fact which have not vet bee·
resolved in this case,

precluding summary judgment.

The amount of the charge for the removal of the IUD,
the purpose for removing the IUD are material facts which must
resolved in order to make a determination as to whether
appellants incurred damage prior to the effective Jate of 1 .!t~ 1

M

'.1111<>t,1ted

.,r

§63-30-4, ;:is amended.

It is ;;ppellants' position

Gibbs' charges to the Payne's for removal of the IUD

llr

.• r~ charges incurred bv the Payne's as a direct result of their
rcl1ance on negligent advice given them by Ors. Kesler and Myers,

'"d that these charges constituted damages to the Paynes which
"ere incurred prior to the effective date of U.C.A. §63-30-4, as

If respondants claim that those facts are not clearly
•ct torch at the present time in the record in the lower court,
tt

is because the evidence has not been presented to a trier of

race and the factual issues must be determined before any deci31,on on a motion for summary judgment can be affirmed.
cdted above, however,

As indi-

it is the position of appellants that the

racts relating to those issues are adequately set forth in the
record and there is no need for further discovery or fact finding
un

issues.

~hose

The deposition of Dr. Gibbs, which is a part of

enc record on appeal, clearly sets forth that the purpose for
the IUD was to allow the Paynes to conceive a second

r~moving
.~1ld.

''·

·1,,,

This purpose is even implied in questions addressed to

G1~hs
cit

oy the attorney for appellant Kesler during the deposi-

l)r. Gibbs.

Dr. Gibbs testified as follows:

[By Mr. Carney] Do you have any
recollection of any conversations with
Mrs. Pavne or her husband regarding taking
the IUD out?

Q.

~.

As to why she was getting it out?

·~.

Yes.

-3-

A.

Not specifically, no.

Q.

Well, generally do you recall -Obviously she wanted to get it out
because she wanted to get pregnant.
Do
you remember any conversations about her
decision to try to become pregnant again?

A.

No.

****
Q.

Well, she had the IUD out in February
and she apparently is now using contraceptive foam?

A.
I always recommend they use some
contraceptive for a month after taking the
IUD out.

Q.

Why is that?

A.
It seems as though the incidence of
miscarriage or tubal pregnancy is
increased in those who become pregnant
immediately after an IUD.
[emphasis
added]
[Gibbs Depo. pp. 20, 21, 22]
Respondant Kesler's attorney's own question to Dr. Gibbs
assumes the fact that the IUD was removed so that Mrs. Payne
could become pregnant.

Moreover,

it is clear from the answers

given by Dr. Gibbs that he also was assuming the purpose for the
removal of the IUD was to allow Mrs. Payne to become pregnant.
With respect to the question of whether the cost of
removing the IUD was charged to the Paynes, Exhibit A to Or.
Gibbs' deposition included his statement for charges to the
Paynes over several years time.

The Paynes were billed in "''"

lump sum for all of the Ob. /Gyn. care provided by Dr. Gibbs as i
related to the pregnancy which resulted in the birth of Michd•l
Payne.

That would include removal of the IUD in Febnrnry, 1978.

-4-

l Dr. Gibbs made regular charges for services relating to the
; ,,IJ

LS

tu rt her evidenced by a specific entry in his billing chart

to the Paynes in 1979 for insertion of the IUD.

It is fair and

reasonable to imply from the exhibits and the facts on record in
this case that an expense was incurred by the Paynes for removal
ut

the IUD, which otherwise would not have been incurred had the

negligent advice not been given by the respondents.

Appellants

have already discussed, in appellants' original brief, the
existence of a legal obligation to pay for the removal of the IUD
at the time this service was performed, which obligation consti:utes damages to them.
Thus, the facts are either adequately before the court
or there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary
judgment.
POINT I I.
UTAH'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE SETS
FORTH A FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
NOT A STATUTE OF REPOSE.
Respondent Kesler charges that the four-year period for
filing a medical malpractice claim set forth in Utah Code
Annotdted 178-14-4 is not a statute of limitations, but is a
';lJtutc· of repose, and therefore discounts appellants' argument

, ,,,,1 rhey obtained a right or claim as of the date that the four' car pPriod began to run under §78-14-4.
•hdt

Appellants' position is

Utah's Medical Malpractice Act has two limitation periods.

!he first is a two-year period from the date of discovery of the
LnJurv.

"r

~ne

The second is a maximum four-year period from the date
negligence.
-5-

In Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), this
court referred to the four-year period as a limitations period
at least two occasions.

The court stated:

The next question to be addressed is
whether the action, which was originally
filed without serving a notice of intent
to sue as required by §78-14-8, could be
refiled after the running of the four-year
limitations period.

* * * *
Since plaintiff did not serve a notice
of intent to commence action upon defendant within the four-year statute of limitations period, it is arguable that the
first action was therefore not "commenced"
within the meaning of §78-12-40 and that
its savings provision is not applicable.
[emphasis added]
(601 P.2d at 149)
It is clear from the above-quoted language in Foil, that
the Utah Supreme Court considers the four-year period to be a
statute of limitations and not a statute of repose as assumed by
respondent Kesler.

Since the four-year time period is a statute

of limitations, then pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §63-30-11(11,
as amended in 1983, plaintiffs' initial position is that the clairr
arose when that four-year statute of limitations began to run.
The four-year statute of limitations began to run on the date of
the negligence, which was clearly prior to the effective date oi
§63-30-4.

Alternatively, plaintiffs take the position that a

claim arose when the first medical expense or detriment occurrerl
as a result of the negligent advice, which in this case is the
time of the removal of the IUD.
Since plaintiffs had a claim in either case which had
arisen prior to the effective date of §63-30-4, then to applv th''
-6-

,,~rute

to this case and preclude personal liability of the indi-

c1dudl physicians, would constitute an improper retroactive applicdt1on of said statute.
POINT III.
DAMAGE WAS INCURRED BY APPELLANTS PRIOR TO
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF U.C.A.
§63-30-4, AS
AMENDED, AND APPELLANTS DID HAVE A CLAIM
PRIOR TO SAID EFFECTIVE DATE.
Contrary to the arguments of respondents, plaintiffs did
incur damages prior to the effective date of §63-30-4.
been previously noted above,

As has

the expenses for medical care pro-

vided by Dr. Gibbs to the Paynes for removal of the IUD were
incurred prior to the effective date of §63-30-4.

These expenses

would not have been incurred had the Paynes not relied on the
ddvice of Drs. Kesler and Myers that it was genetically safe for
them to conceive and bear a second child.

The expenses are,

therefore, damages incurred by Paynes giving them a cause of
action prior to the effective date of §63-30-4.

All other sub-

sequent damages relate back to the same negligence and are part of
the same cause of action.
POINT IV.
U.C.A. §63-30-4, AS AMENDED, IS AMBIGUOUS
AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION BY
THE COURT.
Respondents argue in their briefs that §63-30-4 is clear
Jn its face and unambiguous and therefore there need be no
i1t~rpretation made of the statute by this court contrary to the

-7-

plain language of the statute.

Appellants,

in their initial

brief in this case, have clearly pointed out that this statute
ambiguous.

Section 63-30-4 is not only itself ambiguous, but

i~

becomes even more ambiguous when read in conjunction with other
provisions of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act and also when real
in conjunction with the provisions of Utah's Indemnity Act, which
was in force at all times relevant to this case.
tutes simply cannot be reconciled.

Moreover, this court in

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983),
11, (quoted in appellants' brief),

The various sta·

in footnotes

and

set forth situations in which

personal liability is still available against a governmental
employee.

If the statutes are so clear and unambiguous as claimec

by respondents,
and 11

then there would have been no need for footnotes;

in Madsen.

In light of the ambiguities contained in the

statute, appellants suggest that the statute must be given a
reasonable interpretation.
Furthermore, appellants note with interest that neither
of the respondents have made any statement in response to
appellants' comments regarding the above-referenced footnotes fro~
Madsen nor have they responded in any way to the policy arguments
raised by the appellants with regard to §63-30-4.

Appellants

c~

only conclude that respondents agree that as a matter of polir•
§63-30-4 cannot be interpreted as they are arguing, and that di'·
court must give a reasonable interpretation to the statute which
does not deny these plaintiffs their rightful actions against toe
doctors for negligence.
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POINT V.
APPELLANTS ARE NOT RELYING ON U.C.A.
§78-14-6 FOR THEIR CLAIMS AGAINST
DEFENDANTS.
Defendant Myers raises Utah Code Annotated §78-14-6 as a
basis for denying any liability.

This section requires that any

guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result given by a
health care provider may only be used as a basis for liability
against that health care provider if it is in writing.

Myers

argues that since plaintiffs have not brought forth any writing
guaranteeing that their second child would not be born with any
genetic defects, that any claim of liability against Myers is
barred.
Defendant Myers' argument falls wide of the mark.
Plaintiffs are not alleging a breach of contract or guarantee
against the defendant doctors.

Rather, plaintiffs are claiming

that said defendants gave negligent advice.
malpractice action, not a contract action.

This is a medical
Therefore, any

reference to Utah Code Annotated §78-14-6 is irrelevant.

It is

also outside the scope of any of the pleadings or arguments raised
in this appeal and should not be considered by this court.
"f

None

the defendants raised §78-14-6 as an affirmative defense in

1_f,e1

r answers to plaintiffs' complaint.

It was also not raised as

" IJa:-; 1 s for any of def end ants' mot ions for summary judgment.

It,

therefore, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Park City Utah Corp. v.
f:is_1g_n__C:_Cl_._, 586 P.2d 446 (Utah 1978):

-9-

Where a party neither rdises an issue in
its pleadings nor presents it to the trial
court, the issue cannot be considered for
the first time on appeal.
[586 P.2d at
450.]
An affirmative defense must be raised by way of answer, motion oc
demand so as to put the issue before the trial court, and it is
not to be raised for the first time on appeal.

The defense mav

be waived, or the party may be estopped to assert such defense.
See Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2ci
793 (Utah 1979).
Thus, Meyers cannot raise U.C.A. §78-14-6 as an affimative defense for the first time on appeal.
POINT VI.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER UTAH RECOGNIZES A
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL LIFE IS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
Defendant Myers also raises the issue of whether Utah
acknowledges a cause of action for wrongful life.

This is

clearly outside the scope of this appeal and cannot be raised ~
Myers as a basis for affirming the lower court's decision.

The

lower court's summary judgment was based exclusively on the
theory that §63-30-4 of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act precludes personal liability on the part of employees of the StatE.
The issue of whether Utah would recognize a cause uf
action for wrongful life is not an issue properly raised on
appeal.

In fact,

that very issue was raised by both defentfanC<

Myers and Kesler in motions for partial summarv judgml!nt filed ,'

- 1 0-

:~8.1.

l>oth of which motions were denied by Judge David Dee.

J•h«e !Jee' s order was not made a final order, and is therefore
'"it

dppealilble at this time.

~ga1nst

Moreover, Judge Dee's ruling

said defendants' motions for partial summary judgment is

che law of the case at this point, and it is totally improper for
Myers lo raise this issue as a point for affirmance of the lower

court's summary judgment.
Furthermore, the references to Utah Code Annotated

§§78-11-23 and 24 are also improper because said statute is not
applicable to this case.

Said statute was passed and became

effective for the first time in 1983, and has no application to
the facts of this case.

Even if the statute is referred to for a

sLdtement of policy, it relates to claims made where the person
mdk1ng the claim alleges that a person would not have been born,
but would have been aborted but for the conduct of the person
against whom the claim is made.

There is nothing on record in

chis case, and it is not plaintiffs' claim, that an abortion
would have occurred had they discovered the genetic disease prior
rJ

rhe birth of their second child.

Plaintiffs' claim is that

they would not have conceived a second child had proper coun•e l i~g and advice been given them by the defendant doctors.
'"''' tc>rce,
1t)l1'

in

the policy claimed by defendant Myers, is not appli-

this case.
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POINLfil·
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §63-30-4 DENIES EQUAL
PROTECTION BECAUSE IT BEARS NO RATIONAL
RELATIONSHIP TO A VALID STATE INTEREST.
Respondents argue that §63-30-4 does not deny plaintiffs equal protection because the statute bears a rational
relationship to a valid state interest.

The state interest they

set forth is the vitality of the Governmental Immunity Act.
Respondents argue that the amendment to §63-30-4 was necessary
to prevent circumvention of the Governmental Immunity Act
through the Indemnity Act.

Although preservation of the

Governmental Immunity Act may be a valid state interest, U.C.A.
§63-30-4 bears no rational relationship to that interest.
Rather than taking a course to preserve the vitality of the
Immunity Act, §63-30-4 emasculates basic common law rights of
these plaintiffs and of all other persons who are subjected to
negligent medical care by physicians employed by the State.

The

statute brushes with too broad a stroke and therefore does not
bear a rational relationship to a valid state interest.

For

that reason, equal protection has been denied these plaintiffs
by this statute and it should be declared unconstitutional.
Further,

retroactive application of the statute denies

equal protection because it requires a class of persons such as
plaintiffs to assume a risk of not being able to be adequatelv
compensated for negligent medical care provided by stateemployed physicians.

That retroactive application of a stat 11 te

can result in a denial of equal protection is shown in ~':1£_~_"_:.

-1 2-

..;at~h__E_l_e.<:_t_ric Co., Inc., 546 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976).
CONCLUSION
The lower court's summary judgment in favor of defendents Myers and Kesler should be reversed by the Supreme Court
becduse §63-30-4, as amended, cannot be applied to this case in a
retroactive manner to deprive plaintiffs of their claims, and
because §63-30-4, as amended, cannot be interpreted to deny any
liability whatsoever on the part of physicians who have committed malpractice just because they happen to be employed by
the State.
On the basis of the foregoing, appellants respectfully
request the court to revt[se the lower court's summary judgment.
Daeed 'hia

/(!

day

0~1983.
STRONG lie HAN
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